Ontological Commitment and Its Implication to Semantical Objects of Religious Language

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ABSTRACT

This research is aimed at explaining and analyzing the ontological status of semantical objects of religious language. This ontological status concern how every term in religious language refers to an object and how we interpret those terms, whether it represents the object itself or merely its sensual or constructive properties. This finding lies in the disputation between religious realism and non-realism. The results of this research are (1) every believer is exactly a realist because he or she has the ontological commitment to the object of the utterance, but (2) God exists independently from human thought and consciousness, (3) it is possible to put God as the object of intentional and semantic but only represents sensible qualities of the real object, and (4) the meaning of religious language depends on believer's ontological commitment on God's existence.

Keywords: Existence, Ontological Commitment, Ontological Status, Religious Language, Semantic.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The uniqueness of a believer is the ability to be consistent with a firmly held faith, where he believes that his intentionality can capture fictional entities including the accompanying properties. In semantic discourse, meaning cannot be separated from the intentional action between the subject and the object. As John Haugeland emphasized in the case of belief, intentionality is about the relation between A as something that contains intentionality and B as something that is represented (state of affairs). By that explanation, Haugeland is concerned that if A is assumed to be a belief, then the second relatum "does not have to" exist. A belief, especially religious belief cannot necessarily be justified as wrong just because one of the *relatums* (i.e. object referred by a designator or predication) does not exist in reality. Therefore, in the context of intentionality, subject-object relations are not only factual but also normative (Haugeland, 1990). It was relatable to the discourse of semantics of divinity.

In subject-object relationality, information overlapping is an important variable for understanding the boundary between subject and object. That is, the abundance of this information indicates a condition in which the subject cannot capture or process information (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Therefore, humans are required to simplify the world and then use proxy information to direct thoughts and actions (thoughts and behavior) (Spatola & Urbanska, 2020). In the context of this research, the abundance of information is correlated with uncertainty. Both are part of the whole universe which is mysterious– a term used by Rudolf Otto to describe the divine reality– which cannot be completely uncovered and exposed. The human inability to eliminate uncertainty is a distinctive part of the human relationship with God. In this case, God can be stated as a "real object" that cannot be fully grasped both in substance and quality or essence. So, the only way is to play in the realm of semantics. However, the question is "On what basis do we say a statement about a thing (object) can be meaningful?" Another question is; "Does a statement interpreted in such a way refer to a concrete object?" Or if it is not a concrete object that resolves it, then what kind of object is removed in the semantic activity?

According to John Searle, belief is nothing but an intentional condition because the subject's belief is always related (directed at), about, or represents certain objects (Searle, 1984). According to Searle, beliefs, desires, and other intentional states have an intrinsic representation capacity, where social is its essential form. In other words, the subject has mental states which are intrinsically intentional (Cicourel, 1987). Intentionality is always related to content-full objects, that is, faith as an intentional act will always be associated with an object that has a unique property. As Anselm presupposes, this unique property will always exist in the activity of thinking, including thinking about God, regardless of whether the thought is in support of or denying the existence of God. Anselm makes an analogy with an atheist named Gaunilo's

rejection as a paradoxical thing. Along with his refusal, Gaunilo was proving the existence of God. In his doubts and denials, God has been present in his understanding. Therefore, what is understood is to fall into the category of existing both in thought and in reality (Plantinga, 1968a; 1968b).

Ontological commitment to the existence of God is the essence of a believer. However, the problem lies in the relationship between the ontological commitment and the subject's statement about the committed object. Believers certainly have a commitment to what they believe in or objects that are believed to exist, but this becomes problematic if drawn into a semantic context because "How can we say a statement or religious language is something meaningful when the object referred to is not clear or difficult to concretize? Or perhaps the divine object has been subordinated to human consciousness and thought so that the semantic divinity does not at all represent a state of affairs of the divinity object. In other words, intentionally, the semantic object of divinity is contentless. Therefore, through this article, I would like to offer a rationalization of ontological commitment and its implications for divine semantics. In order not to be too broad, divine semantics will be discussed in the context of religious language. Regarding these implications, divine semantics in religious language will be placed in the debate between realism and antirealism. However, in religious studies, it is more appropriate to use the term non-realism as a differentiator from the philosophy of scientific discourse.

II. LANGUAGE, FACTS, AND DIVINITY

Regarding the semantics of divinity, the definition, description, and naming of divinity can never be separated from the problem of the ontological status of semantics, where the main question is "Does the semantics of divinity refer to the stated reality?". If indeed the divine semantics have a reference, then what kind of reality does this statement refer to?

In religious studies, realism is mostly implemented in semantic corridors, hence realism will be discussed more as a reference theory (Byrne, 2004). If we think about how the ancestors talked about "non-existent" things such as God, magic, sense-data, and the like, then in philosophical analysis, it is important to ask questions about the relation of these statements to the world-the relationship between naming and truth. This proves the difference between rationality and truth. The ancestors expressed or narrated with various names for the non-existent reality but had difficulty in bringing the narrative together with the concrete reality. In answering the above question, philosophy requires two arguments. First, historical clarity is needed about the triumph of rationality as a gradual process. However, if you emphasize knowledge as being directly related to the world or not, including the relation of language to reality, then the difficulty is in the real naming – whether the given name represents the reality named. This is important because culturally non-existent objects occupy a crucial position in every narrative constructed by the ancestor. *Second,* to distinguish between justified belief and true belief, it is necessary to ask a classic question about how the subject is connected to reality-about our contact with reality. The next question is how could the ancestors be consistent with their naming of a non-existent reality when they did not know exactly about the object of naming and including the reality they are talking about? (Rorty, 1976).

Referring to the question above, the answer is that there is a philosophical difference between "facts and language". This difference is between what the ancestors talked about (facts) and the words used to talk about those facts (language). If referring to the linguistic framework, individual statements in religious statements will be relative. In another emphasis, using the "instrumentalist" distinction, it can be said that everyone is always in direct contact with the world (the observables), but gradually (gradual) disclosure of reality through linguistic functions will proceed towards a clearer direction, namely in terms of the level of accuracy. In other words, the more/frequently the subject makes predictions and observations as the investigation process continues, the clearer the reality revealed. However, if using a "holistic" distinction, the subject will be able to expand his reach to the world (the world) by including both observable and unobservable things. Treating the observables as the same as "the unobservables" is to clarify the relationship between reality—existent and non-existent—for individual statements and the framework as a whole (Rorty, 1976).

Continuing Rorty's explanation above, it is necessary to clarify that the semantics of the world as outlined in linguistic activities cannot be separated from the realism tradition, especially referential realism. Its main purpose is to answer the question "Do the language and meanings we use represent reality? "What is the relationship between language and reality?" To answer these two questions, one can refer to the correspondence theory which later became the basis for referential realism. The main goal of referential realism is to identify the content of the language and the real world to which it corresponds, or in Locke's terms, "are conformable". In other words, referential realism—one of them—focuses on object semantics and identifies the content of language expressions as a proper name and predicate expression.

In the identification process, the object of naming is assumed to be an individual that exists, and what is referred to by the predicate expressions is assumed to be a quality (*qualia*) of sensory experience (Hanna & Harrison, 2004).

The main claim of referential realism is that semantic content—whatever type of linguistic entity it refers to or corresponds to—is an element that exists in reality. Contrary to referential realism, namely, conventionalism which holds the principle that all entities referred to by language are linguistic constructions or in other words, the entity as a whole is formed by linguistic conventions. Furthermore, what about objects that are referenced by language as language in the Western scientific community and language in the Azande shaman community? Are the two different in referencing reality? If one is the most correct, then what is the reason for calling it the most correct and the others are wrong? Answering this question, referential realism refers to Locke's view that the entity referred to by scientific language is an entity that exists, while the language used in the Azande shaman community is the fiction of language. This answer makes it clear that referential realism does not want to be trapped in the abyss of relativism. Claims of referential truth must involve exceptions because if the entities referred to by language were assumed to be true—without exceptions—then it would be tantamount to linguistic constructivism assumptions. Simply, the hypothesis offered by referential realism is that the mind can directly intend the object of language because the intention is a process that is inherent in both the mind and language. However, it conforms to the principle of mind-independent reality (Hanna & Harrison, 2004). To clarify the logical relationship between principle (1) that language can correspond to reality and principle (2) where reality is still assumed to be independent of thought, it is necessary to reduce semantics which will be referred to as the doctrine of semantic reductionism.

Semantic reductionism can be broadly found in Russell's early thought, especially regarding the epistemological doctrines of acquaintance and description. Russell offers both to classify knowledge (epistemic consideration). Knowledge-based on acquaintance is knowledge of the object itself (knowledge of things), while knowledge based on description is the knowledge that always involves knowledge of the "truth" (knowledge of truths). However, it should be underlined that according to the needs of this study, the two categories or classifications will be positioned as a matter of semantic consideration, not as an epistemic concern. Referring to semantic foundationalism, the relation between the mind and reality cannot be realized without the involvement of linguistic concepts and constructions. The process of knowing based on description is a process that involves the dimension of language, while the process of knowing based on acquaintance is a process that is outside the linguistic context so that it deals with the presence of the world that cannot be mediated (unmediated presence of the world) (Hanna & Harrison, 2004).

Based on the description above — semantic consideration — the semantic character of the acquaintance and description processes will become clear if placed in the context of reductionism. Russell argues that all kinds of knowledge, whether knowledge of objects or knowledge of the truth have a foundation, namely acquaintance. As an explanation, acquaintance is not a claim to knowledge — about how to complete knowledge — but about what is being discussed, namely about the true meaning of words. Therefore, the use of language will always be accompanied by meaning, or in other words, the subject is required to include meaning in every language used. This necessity is in using language according to its significant function or specific use, not a language without direction and purpose (mere utter noise). The meaning attached to each word in language activities must be something that is acquired. For example, the statement about Julius Caesar. It can be said that Julius Caesar is not included in the mind because the thinking subject does not directly access or intersect with Julius Caesar. What the subject has is only a description of Julius Caesar — the founder of the Roman empire or just a person named Julius Caesar. Therefore, the statement does not refer to or represent the object, so it can be said that the description of Julius Caesar is composed of both particular and universal truths that are connected with things that can be directly accessed by the subject (Hanna & Harrison, 2004).

The fact referred to by the abstraction of numbers is one example that can be linked to the relationship between designators (language, numbers, symbols, and so on) with facts. In the case of arithmetic, some axioms work together with abstraction in quantifying the world or reality.

The fundamental question is how do we arrive at an agreement that an axiom applies in the relation between the designator and the reality referred to? Responding to this question, Ringen (1980) explained that claims about physical facts and claims about arithmetic facts play an important role in the evaluation of axiomatic theories of physics and axiomatic theories in arithmetic. In particular, an axiomatic theory in either discipline is adequate only if it can generate theorem descriptions of the well-attested facts in the domain of the theory. Therefore, a set-theoretic axiomatization of arithmetic is adequate only if it can generate a statement of the fact that 2+2=4.

III. RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Regarding the language of religion, several questions can be asked. 1) What is the meaning of using religious language? What is the difference between religious language and ordinary language? How does religious language become meaningful? These three questions can be used as a fundamental problem of religious language. The problem of religious language is rooted in peculiar objects inherent in religious claims, namely transcendental objects which are generally even obligatory in every religion called God (Vainio, 2020). Transcendental objects can be understood as the opposite of immanent objects because they are in a reality that is "believed" to be a divine reality that is far from human reach, or even completely untouchable by humans. In other words, it shows an ontological attitude towards a reality that is completely independent of human thought and consciousness. Whatever perception of the world is judged as inadequate in representing the pure object known as God. In the tradition of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), it is referred to as a real object. However, the correlation between object categories initiated in the OOO tradition and transcendental/divine objects is still being debated. On the one hand, a Theist certainly has an ontological commitment to the existence of God and must also be a realist. With full awareness, a theist admits that humans cannot fully touch God, but also does not deny that speaking God (or at least religious experience) is an unavoidable thing in human social life. The main argument for this statement is that language and linguistic expressions are parts that are congruent with human existential modes. However, it should be noted that every statement, especially about God, runs linearly by reducing the representation of pure objects (real objects). Because language activity, including religious language, is an activity that operates in the semantic domain. In this domain, it is impossible to negate human thoughts and intentions as subjects because, however, the subject in the process of constructing meaning cannot be separated from preconditions, preconceptions, or pre-structural understanding which is nothing but an unavoidable hermeneutical circle. However, it should be underlined that the hermeneutical circle in question is hermeneutics in an ontological context, not as a set of methods that require the separation of subjects from objects. Therefore, the activity of understanding is the equivalent of philosophy itself, in which the subject as an interpreter expresses his thoughts and awareness of the Divine through linguistic statements without setting aside or even rejecting intersubjectivity, historicity, and plurality of horizons.

The main goal to be achieved in research on religious language is to gain an understanding of the meaning of religious sentences and utterances. Religious sentences in general require the presence of a declaring subject, so that religious statements are an integral part of an activity of speaking and writing about religious experience. In principle, the subject uses the medium of language to express and explain various divine agents and properties as well as other supernatural entities (Scott, 2017). Therefore, the statement of divinity in religious life and those who are concerned about rejecting it is very important. The defense and rejection of the existence of God always revolve around the semantic level in every argumentative statement. The main objection of atheists is about the meaningfulness of divine statements which are considered meaningless statements because they do not refer to concrete objects. They demand an equalization of the semantic object of divinity with the object of scientific investigation, where in science the object must be clear and observable. In other words, what is at issue is the religious content in the statement of divinity.

Research on the language of religion has become a topic that is seriously discussed in the history of philosophy, for quite a long time, namely since the Middle Ages (Scott, 2017). Much attention has come from medieval theologians and philosophers who are concerned with the meaning of divine predicates which encompasses the debates around analogy and *apophaticism* (Scott & Citron, 2016; White, 2010). Besides that, the history of religious language can also be referred to the debate about the meaningfulness of religious language pioneered by A.J. Ayer through his famous philosophy, namely logical positivism in his famous work Language, Truth, and Logic and became a central topic in the discourse of the philosophy of religion through the mid-twentieth century. In continental Europe, the topic of religious language is also a quite crucial discussion (Jacques, 1989; Marion, 1994; Scott, 2017).

When referring to the scriptural context and the variety of interpretation methodologies, religious texts are bound by the cultural structure and historical context in which the text is (believed to be) revealed by God. Therefore, the interpretation of sacred texts cannot rule out the nature of their existence as linguistic texts including all the linguistic implications that accompany them. In linguistic studies, the text is tied to the context of space and time in historical and sociological terms (Akhmad, 2008; Hanifiyah, 2020).

There are two general approaches to understanding religious language or religious utterances, namely: 1) theos-oriented or God-oriented and 2) anthropo-oriented. First, what is meant by religious language is God's statement that is recorded and enshrined in the holy book. In this position, God and His word are the main focus so the most basic understanding of religious language is the language of the scriptures. Second, the language of religion is the religious expression and behavior of a person or social group. Thus, the language of religion in the second sense is religious discourse carried out by religious people (Hanifiyah, 2020). Referring to Hanifiyah's explanation, the language of religion is placed in the grand narrative of theology. Then, the question we can ask is "Is the definition of religious language determined by the concept

of religion as an institution?"; "What about the language of religion in the context of religion as a non-institutional?"

In this research, the language of religion is more directed at the discourse of the philosophy of divinity, in which the semantic object of divinity which is the core content of the language of religion becomes an important thing to clarify. This semantic content is then associated with the subject's ontological commitment as the utterer of a divine statement. What is important in this study is not the sociological and pragmatic aspects of religious language which highlight aspects of functionality, but rather the analytic discourse on object ontology. The implication is that objects referred to by religious language require clarity about status, whether the object is in a mind-dependent world or a mind-independent world.

Referring to the value of interpreting religious language, religious statements such as "God is omnipotent" are treated as things that contain semantic content or propositional content. Therefore someone who utters these statements expresses his belief that God is omnipotent through statements we call religious statements (Scott, 2013). In that condition, the speaker has an ontological commitment to the existence of God and this commitment is a prerequisite for his statement to contain semantic content and not a contentless statement.

IV. Intentional Semantics of Divinity

Intentionality is a feature of certain mental states about certain events. Intentionality refers to a direction (directed at), regarding a thing (being about), or represents a particular entity or condition. For example, Robert had a belief that Ronald Reagan was president, so his belief was an intentional condition because the belief was directed at a certain thing or object or about and referred to Ronald Reagan and all the conditions that fulfilled it as a condition that he may be called the president. Ronald Reagan was the intentional object of Robert's belief, and the existence of the circumstances that made Ronald Reagan the president was the condition of satisfaction of his beliefs. If a belief is not at all directed or about something, then it cannot be said to be a thing that has an intentional object, and if the referenced state of affairs does not exist, then the condition becomes not satisfied (Searle, 1984).

According to Searle, intentional mental phenomena are part of natural biological reality. Feelings of thirst, visual experiences, desires, fears, and expectations are as much an integral part of a person's biological life history as breathing and sleep. Therefore, intentional phenomena like other biological phenomena are intrinsic features of a biological organism. The intrinsic dimension of intentional phenomena is caused by neuro-psychological processes that take place in the brain. One will never know in detail about the connectedness or causal relationship between neurons and visual experiences or other feelings such as thirst. This ignorance can be called empirical ignorance about the specifics of a neuronal process in the brain and is not the result of a metaphysical debate between two categories, namely mind, and body (Searle, 1984).

Broadly speaking, in the divinity semantic discourse, the criticisms of the divinity argument depart from the justification of the ontic status of the intentional object. A statement will be assessed as meaningful if and only if the intentionality of the subject leads to an object that exists in reality. As Daniel C. Dennett argues, intentionality is something derived from natural reality. For example, the grocery list in your head is not intrinsic intentionality but intentionality that refers to an object in concrete reality, namely a shopping list on a piece of paper (Dennett, 1998). Referring to Mirolli's interview with Dennett, Dennett takes an example of the very significant use of the word "voice" in human verbal communication activities—to the exclusion of identity theory—and what should be noted is that there is nothing mysterious about the word "sound". Therefore, in dealing with the word "sound", Dennett does not use the approach commonly used by metaphysicians, which is too complicated in thinking about the ontic status, quality, and other properties of an object "sound". Dennett opted for a more pragmatic approach (Mirolli & Dennett, 2002) specifically pragma-linguistic, namely in analyzing language based on its practical use. The consequence of Dennett's statement above is that if the intentional object is completely unrelated to natural reality, or in other words, if the intentional object is outside of natural reality or as supernatural, then it does not qualify to be called an object. Therefore, the semantics derived from the object become ontologically and epistemologically invalid. In addition, the resulting statement will be meaningless.

Regarding intentional semantics, the researcher cites Dale Jacquette's opinion, that it is necessary to conduct a neutral ontological investigation in terms of the subject's interpretation of the object. For example, the Vulcan god—the non-existent God—was postulated by religious mythologists. Vulcan as a non-existent planet was erroneously hypothesized by an astronaut named Leverrier. The need to use a neutral ontology approach becomes important in response to this case. In intentional semantics, the object of thought—both existing and non-existent—directly references and has a constitutive property: the predicate. Therefore, even though Vulcan—as a god or a planet—is a non-existent object, it still has a unique property that allows

the subject to identify and individualize it (Jacquette, 1989). Therefore, Vulcan in this state can still be called an object.

Continuing the description above, the researcher would like to offer a neutral object ontology approach for clarity on the ontological status of divine semantic objects. Therefore, the researcher offers two hypotheses: 1) Although the divine reality as an intentional semantic object is transcendent, it does not mean that the divine reality is neither real nor does it exist. In other words, the semantic object of divinity is content-full. In connection with this initial hypothesis, it is necessary to reconstruct object categories to go beyond the strict distinction and demarcation between existing and non-existent domains. 2) there may be an anomaly in the subject's attitude towards objects, especially divine objects. That is, the subject can take a realist attitude toward the object of divinity (the general assumption that God is the same as realists) as well as anti-realism in terms of perception of God. If it is changed into the form of a question, then "Will believers automatically take a realist attitude? Is it possible for an anti-realist to believe in God? Can someone who believes in God's existence be ontologically realist but epistemologically anti-realist?

Within the realist and anti-realist tensions in theist activity, we can take an example from the thought of St. Anselms, that an object of thought cannot be called non-existence because as long as the object that is intense in the activity of thinking leads to a certain object, that object at least exists in the mind. We can respond to Anselm's thought experiment by asking the question, "What is meant by Anselm as an object? What is the ontological status of the object in question? Is the object that Anselms is referring to an object that has the same properties as a real object or is it just a contentless fictional object? This series of questions is the biggest challenge for scholars, especially those who focus on the field of analytical religious studies, especially in discussing the semantics of divinity.

In the Meinongian tradition (Meinongian Theism), the beingness of God is different from the beingness of non-God objects or trivial objects such as tables, chairs, shoes, and so on. Referring to divine objects through religious language is something that at first glance looks paradoxical because the use of religious language to explain God always involves prerequisites in the form of an ontological commitment to God's object and semantic production of the object, but with the additional commitment that the object referred to by language or religious statements not one hundred percent represents God itself. In other words, there has been a reduction at the human level that involves nothing but the construction of mind and consciousness. Therefore, this is what becomes a paradox in the attitude of a believer. At the same time, he must be committed to the existence of God (a realist attitude), and in explaining the experience of God in linguistic practice, he must adopt an anti-realist attitude but within the epistemological scope. This is of course rooted in St Anselm's debate with Gaunilo, that to negate God, God must first exist in the mind. However, as a differentiator from being anti-realist in the corridors of science, what is meant by being epistemically anti-realist is that the object of God is placed as an object in a mind-independent world, while thoughts about God contained in religious language are representations of the sensual qualities of divine objects. Therefore, this sensual object is mind-dependent because it conforms to human perception as a subject of God. This is what causes the concepts of divinity to be very diverse. This argument is rooted in the Kantian style. As explained by Miravalle (2018), we don't conceive of actual things as being different from possible things, and that "existence" adds nothing to our idea of a thing.

V. IMPLICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

Ontological commitment is very crucial in the discourse of the philosophy of divinity. Quine emphasizes that the connection between ontological commitment and entities, for example, numbers, is not only known through attention to the naming of particular numbers but also through the use of variables that position numbers as values. Quine explains that even though they don't exist, numbers determine the significance of the statement "1729 is the accumulation of two cubes in more than one calculation". However, Quine's statement was criticized by Alonzo Church. Numbers do not exist but determining semantic conditions is contradictory because when attributing a property to 1729, one must have an ontological commitment to at least one of the numbers. For this reason, if the nominalist neither rejects mathematics nor adopts an extreme-formalist position that rejects all meanings of mathematical formulations, then he must reformulate propositions, then no name is represented by the number 1729. However, if the number 1729 can ultimately represent a name or "represents" a condition or an entity, then the number 1729 is nothing but a role, not the name itself (Church, 1958). The problem of the ontological status of numbers is often associated with the ontological status of other objects that are considered not concrete, such as discussions about the semantic object of divinity.

The debate between theists and atheists has its complexities and has developed quite rapidly, especially in the extraordinary influence of the four horsemen involving several contemporary thinkers such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Haris. Of the many topics of debate, this article will focus on the topic of ontological commitment as an important part that influences how the

meaning of a divine statement includes various designators of divine reality. Therefore this research will allude to metaphysical realism as a general attitude of theists in addressing divine objects that are to be referred to through language activities.

In referring to divine objects, it is important to depart from the general treatment of non-concrete objects in semantic construction. There is an ontic category, namely modal-ontology which tries to portray an alternative reality that can mediate the conflict between existing and non-existent objects. The alternative is a reality called the possible world. However, in the discourse on God, placing God as part of the determination of a possible world is impossible because it will invalidate the ontological commitment to God's existence. God's existence is a paradoxical certainty for a theist because the divine object is believed to exist perfectly in itself, but a human understanding of it is always in a universe of probabilities. The probability referred to here is not at the ontological level, but at the epistemological level. That is, the articulation of the divine image in the semantic realm never reaches a complete representation of the divine object.

Regarding the alternative view above, an interesting attitude to be involved in the view of actualism which is fairly rigid in holding onto an ontological commitment to an object. The objection to the statement of divinity lies largely in the semantic content. That is, the meaningfulness of a statement is measured based on the object being referred to. This measurability is very relevant to the doctrine of actualism which strictly separates existing and non-existent categories. Quoting Menzel (1990), the main doctrine of actualism is believing that existence and actuality are two things that cannot be separated so that the existence of something is determined by its level of actualization in reality. In other words, existence is determined by actuality. The opposite of actualism is possibilism. The general doctrine of possibilism is that there are only possible objects to be said to exist or only possible objects exist. It should be noted that actualist and possibilist attitudes cannot go hand in hand, or an actualist cannot be committed to possible world semantics at the same time.

If the ontological commitment to the existence of God is linked to the semantic object discourse, then the tension between actualism and possibilism is none other than the ontic status of the object assumed. The conditional on the object is elementary in semantic construction. Therefore, the presupposition of objects, under any circumstances, both in the actualism vs. possibilism debate and others, will lead to realism and anti-realism debates. That is, the most fundamental question is "What is the relationship between the object and the subject? Is the object determined by mind and consciousness or vice versa?". In this research, the realism and anti-realism debates are contextualized into religious discourse or what we can call analytical religious studies. Within the study of religion, the designation of realism and its opposites is quite a bit different from the philosophical tradition of science. The difference is in the use of the term's realism and non-realism. This distinction is still being debated and is still unclear because researchers have not found any literature that clearly explains the difference in the context of the philosophy of science.

Religious realism is a metaphysical theory that shows that divine reality exists. This then becomes the principle for ontological attitudes about objects of religious belief and religious language, including the contingent (independent) existence of the subject's thoughts, actions, and attitudes (Scott and Moore, 1997). In the discourse on the philosophy of religion, there are two views about the logical status of religious language, namely cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Cognitivism affirms that at least there are several religious languages whose truth status can be checked so that they can be said to be true or false. Whereas non-cognitivism rejects what is affirmed by cognitivism, where religious language cannot be investigated or assessed at all (non-assertional). Therefore, non-cognitive emphasizes the emotive, conative, regulative, and persuasive functions of a religious language. For example, S is a believer, then he makes statements, one of which is a statement about God. So, what can be identified from the statement is not the propositions that he believes in, but the type of language used. So that the above classifications—cognitivism and non-cognitivism—are not too general, Jerome Gellman limits them to the context of cognitivist believers and non-cognitivist believers. This limitation is in the context of elaborating religious realism with religious language so that views on religious language from the perspective of religious realism become clear. For non-cognitivist believers, the religious language involved in the statement of divinity does not function as an explanatory "about God" or to refer to a semantic object, namely God himself. Non-cognitive believers position the language of religion as a mere linguistic matter. This is intended to avoid ontological commitments about God (Gellman, 1981).

Ontologically, realists adhere to the principle that there is a reality that is independent and exists outside the human mind and does not depend on human conception or sensual experience. Therefore, reality is assumed to exist objectively, not a subjective discovery or constructed by the human mind. Epistemologically, realists believe that reality is captured by the subject not only as it appears, but can be known as it is. Furthermore, semantically, realists argue that language can reference reality so that subjects can make true statements about reality. Its application is as follows: for example when Christian faith is made the subject of philosophical investigation, especially in the view of realism, then (i) God exists independently of human consciousness and thought, but (ii) humans can still know Him, and (iii) language

humans can be sufficient and appropriate to be used as a medium to express the truth about God (Moore, 2000).

According to John Hick, the main difference between theological realism and non-realism lies in the question of the nature of the world: "Whether the world will be understood as natural or vice versa as understood by religious realism." Religious realism and theological realism can be distinguished based on their respective scopes, in which theological realism focuses more on the theological consequences of fundamental assumptions about the world, while religious realism is more general in scope to ontological assumptions regarding the independence of the world—transcendental reality/divinity— of the human mind and consciousness. However, the difference between the two does not need to be a serious problem. Moore added that the view of theological realism can be measured based on the level of realist attitude in approaching the faith of religion. This realist attitude depends on the commitment chosen when interpreting experiential data—experience or access to reality or transcendental-divine entities. In other words, the attitude of theological or religious realism can be seen in the way religious people understand the reality of divinity, where this understanding can be divided into three: 1) the view that faith is something that cannot be rationalized so that religious experience data is not necessarily interpreted, and 2) in the traditional Christian tradition, religious experience data can be understood or interpreted in religious non-cognitive processes (Moore, 2000). In addition to the debates between cognitivism vs non-cognitivism and *cataphasis* vs *apophasis*, some contributions are also relevant to the discourse on the semantics of God, especially when adjusting to this study. The contribution came from the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) which is relevant to Theistic Conceptual Realism (TCR). The involvement of DDS and TCR in this research is to clarify the debate on the semantics of God, especially in terms of philosophical studies of abstract objects.

Referring to the TCR paradigm, the concept of divinity is understood as an eternal aspect of the divine mind—the eternal aspects of the divine mind—where the abstract and universal dimension is placed on a platonic realist understanding of abstract objects. This placement involves—partially—fundamental phenomena connected with "universal problems" such as property examples, attribution conventions, subject-predicate discourse, and abstract references. This is relevant to theistic activism which seeks to reconcile ontological commitments to the existence of abstract objects with traditional theistic doctrines as can be found in theodicy arguments. DDS emphasizes that God is free from ontological structure and complexity. That is, in God, there is no difference between form and matter, substance and property, thinker and mind (Panchuk, 2021). If it is elaborated with disputation between *cataphasis* and *apophasis*, then TCR is relevant to *cataphasis*, while DDS is relevant to *apophasis*.

Michelle Panchuk offers an elaborative step to the dialogue between TCR and DDS. However, reconciliation efforts will face two obstacles. First, namely the difficulty in answering DDS objections regarding the status of the truth of divine predication. The most popular notion of TCR is about the assumption that properties, both abstract and particular, actually describe concrete particulars. Responding to this, DDS denied that God was given multiple properties. Therefore, an adequate argument to explain the compatibility of TCR and DDS requires an explanation of how simplification of God can be done without including examples of properties, as is the case in traditional theological traditions which attribute God with various properties. Second, namely the challenge to the property-universal equation carried out by the TCR and its consequences for the conception of the Divine. The question that arises is how a simple being can be said to have a multiplicity of concepts. In answering this question, Michael Panchuk offers the most probable version for TCR, that a theist can adopt a platonic style to reconcile a realist view of universals, not only by involving the doctrine of aseity-sovereignty, but also involving DDS (Panchuk, 2021).

In the philosophy of religion, the term realism has a specific meaning. As revealed by John Hick that in the philosophy of religion, concepts such as realism or non-realism are not the same as their meaning in other branches of philosophy. Thus, in the philosophy of religion, the tension of realism vs. non-realism need not be limited to debates outside the context of the philosophy of religion, such as the debate between realism and nominalism about universal ontological status; in the field of epistemology, can take examples from the debate between empiricism, rationalism, and idealism; in the philosophy of science, for example, the tension between realism and anti-realism or instrumentalism and neo-pragmatism; in ethics, moral realism vs emotivism vs non-cognitivism; or even in the philosophy of language that is between semantic realism and structuralism and non-referential post-structuralism (Gericke, 2006). Non-realism—referring to terminology and discourse representation—in the philosophy of religion is a new phenomenon. The term non-realism is often equated with the term anti-realism. Similar to anti-realism, non-realism is also the opposite of a realist perspective. In this respect, non-realists agree with critical realism that all conceptions of God are inevitably culturally and historically influenced. Therefore, religious non-realism differs from critical realism, which does not believe that mythological discourses refer to supernatural realities that exist independently of the textual or imaginary world (Cupitt, 1989; Gericke, 2006).

Regarding the relationship between religious non-realism and naïve realism and critical realism, Jaco Gericke explains it as follows. For non-realists, God is not an extra-textual entity that is directly referred to

by the text, but an entity that is viewed based on a certain culture (culturally relative) and contextual attitudes. In contrast to naïve realism, which views the text as an analog of objects (for example, tables), and critical realism, which sees the relationship between text and objects as inseparable from the context of certain traditions and cultures, so that text cannot be stated as an analog of an object. In contrast to the two, non-realists argue that text can be likened to a mirror that does not reflect anything but is a projection of the subject himself. In other words, religious non-realism in terms of the representation of the name Yahweh is inseparable from the ideal personification of human beings, including values and commitments. However, what needs to be underlined is that religious non-realism is not the same as atheism—in the context of the complete denial of the existence of God. Non-realists in understanding sacred texts argue that the meaning contained in the text is not directly related to the reality of divinity, but rather represents human ideas and does not represent the reality out there. Therefore, non-religious realists do not believe that God or human personifications of ideas exist independently of human language and imagination. On the other hand, the atheist position in non-realism can be relevant to the view of naïve realism which completely breaks the connection between human thought and consciousness and reality, so that it can be said that an atheist with a non-realist view will uphold the principle that ideas and statements about divinity are purely human constructions. and does not refer to objective reality at all (Gericke, 2006).

VI. CONCLUSION

In elaborating realism with the discourse of religiosity, especially in the context of the debate between theism and atheism, it is necessary to place both in the realm of semantic debate, namely regarding ontological arguments for the meaning of religious language. In general, there are three treatments of the semantics of divinity, namely 1) *Kataphasis* (positive theology), the view that believes that the naming of God and the description of God in linguistic expressions are possible because language can represent reality. 2) *Apophasis* (negative theology), a view that avoids naming or defining God. This second view believes that language is incapable of representing the reality of divinity. So, speaking of God is the same as limiting what is truly unlimited, and 3) A view that is not at all interested in religious languages, that is, all religious language is considered meaningless because it refers to non-existent objects. The third view is represented by antirealist (non-realist) tenets that there are none of the objects are directly intended by the believers. It was only a so-called mind-dependent object. So, it has no content at all (contentless objects). This third view also represents most of the atheist tenets. These three views exist in the layer of semantic ontological status which will be closely related to theological discourse both affirming and negating the definition of God's reality.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

In doing this research until it is completely written, the author has no conflict of interest in proving the thesis and achieving the conclusion. Although the author is a believer, he gives a guarantee that all arguments are not in order to defend his own beliefs, but instead analyze problems with a scientific approach and of course can be accounted for rationally. The conclusion of this research is not to defend and promote either theistic or atheistic doctrines. The main objective is to enrich the discourse on the philosophy of divinity and the philosophy of religion, especially those with a strong focus on analytic religious studies which are concerned with semantic issues.

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